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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the modern world, digital data is everywhere. The average person gen-
erates a huge data footprint thanks to technological advancements such as 
cloud storage and increased connectedness of devices. Each day yields ap-
proximately 3.5 billion Google searches and 1.5 billion people active on Fa-
cebook, and every minute there are 156 million emails sent, 4.1 million new 
YouTube video views, 45,000 Uber trips, and 16 million text messages re-
ceived.1 
This massive data stockpile presents opportunities to improve business ef-
ficiency, aid in criminal investigations, and even create new job markets.2 
However, it’s also a logistical nightmare. The sheer volume of data presents 
organizational and analytical challenges.3 Beyond the administrative prob-
lems, there are also privacy concerns and accessibility issues.4 
These privacy and accessibility concerns are even more severe in the con-
text of criminal investigations.5 Because of digital data’s prevalence in mod-
ern society, that type of information is sometimes used as evidence of criminal 
activity.6 But there remain questions on how much of a person’s digital foot-
print should be accessible when that person’s civil liberties are on the line.7 
The issue is further complicated when data flows between multiple foreign 
states and the data must be shared across international borders. 
Cross-border data sharing is a major hurdle to data accessibility, especially 
in the context of data sharing as part of criminal investigations. International 
entities must cooperate for effective data sharing because digital data moves 
 
 1 Bernard Marr, How Much Data Do We Create Every Day? The Mind-Blowing Stats 
Everyone Should Read, FORBES (May 21, 2018, 12:42 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
bernardmarr/2018/05/21/how-much-data-do-we-create-every-day-the-mind-blowing-stats 
-everyone-should-read/#642381fb60ba. 
 2 See Andrew McAfee & Erik Brynjolfsson, Big Data: The Management Revolution, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/10/big-data-the-management-revolutio 
n; See also Sean E. Goodison, Robert C. Davis, & Brian A. Jackson, Digital Evidence and 
the U.S. Criminal Justice System: Identifying Technology and Other Needs to More Effec-
tively Acquire and Utilize Digital Evidence, RAND CORP. (2015), https://www.ncjrs.gov/p 
dffiles1/nij/grants/248770.pdf. 
 3 B. R. Prakash & M. Hanumanthappa, Issues and Challenges in the Era of Big Data 
Mining, 3 INTL. J. EMERGING TRENDS & TECH. COMPUTER SCI. 321 (2014). 
 4 Id.; see also Top 12 Common Problems in Data Mining, BIG DATA MADE SIMPLE 
(Feb. 3, 2015), http://bigdata-madesimple.com/12-common-problems-in-data-mining/. 
 5 Brian A. Jackson, Using Digital Data in Criminal Investigations: Where and How to 
Draw the Line?, FORENSIC MAG. (May 11, 2017), https://www.forensicmag.com/news/201 
7/05/using-digital-data-criminal-investigations-where-and-how-draw-line. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
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freely outside of international boundaries.8 Consider an email sent from At-
lanta, Georgia to Seattle, Washington. That email might take a direct route 
across the United States, but it is also possible the email could bounce through 
a Canadian server before reaching its final destination.9 Cloud storage further 
erodes data’s respect for international borders because stored data could be 
held in storage centers located across the globe in nations such as India, Ire-
land, or Chile.10 
Various agreements and pieces of legislation have attempted to facilitate 
cross-border data sharing. The most recent law addressing this issue is the 
Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, which is a United 
States law enacted in March 2018.11 The CLOUD Act is aimed at assisting 
criminal investigations by allowing law enforcement to collect data stored in 
foreign states.12 The CLOUD Act achieves this purpose through two main 
functions. 
First, the CLOUD Act forces U.S. companies to comply with domestic 
warrants and turn over digital data, regardless of whether the data is “physi-
cally” stored in the United States or on foreign soil.13 As an illustration of this 
function, imagine an Irish citizen who allegedly commits a crime against the 
United States. Law enforcement wants to obtain emails held on a Microsoft 
account, but “physically” located on a server in Ireland, as part of their inves-
tigation. The CLOUD Act allows law enforcement to obtain this data via a 
U.S. warrant, without consideration of Irish law.14 
The CLOUD Act’s second function gives the executive branch of the 
United States power to enter into data sharing executive agreements with for-
eign governments.15 For example, the United States could have a data sharing 
executive agreement with Australia. If the Australian government requested 
data held by Microsoft, or any other U.S. technology company, the United 
States would be inclined to turn over the data with no additional process.16 
 
 8 Jennifer Daskal, Law Enforcement Access to Data Across Borders: The Evolving Se-
curity and Rights Issues, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 473, 475 (2016). 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Zarine Kharazian, The CLOUD Act: Arguments for and Against, INT’L ENF’T L. REP. 
(Apr. 10, 2018), https://ielrblog.com/index.php/2018/04/10/the-cloud-act-arguments-for-a 
nd-against/. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 This hypothetical situation mirrors the facts of United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 
S. Ct. 356 (2017) (mem.) (granting government’s petition for certiorari), which is the Su-
preme Court case that the CLOUD Act was written to address. The CLOUD Act rendered 
United States v. Microsoft Corp. moot. 
 15 Kharazian, supra note 11. 
 16 There are several caveats that could affect this situation. These caveats, and the exec-
utive agreement provision in general, will be discussed further in subsequent sections of 
this Note. 
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This Note presents a comprehensive look at cross-border data sharing, 
placing special emphasis on the CLOUD Act. It briefly recounts the history 
of U.S. legislation governing cross-border data accessibility in criminal inves-
tigations, while illustrating that modern advancements in law enforcement 
techniques and data management systems created a need for liberalized cross-
border data sharing. This Note will explain how the CLOUD Act fulfills that 
need by streamlining the cumbersome process previously used to request ex-
traterritorially stored data. This Note will further discuss both domestic and 
international reaction to the CLOUD Act. It will suggest that reaction within 
the United States was mostly positive, but the foreign response was mixed and 
exuded nervousness about the Act’s potential impacts (especially regarding 
the executive agreements provision). Finally, this Note will provide recom-
mended amendments to the executive agreements provision. The suggested 
amendments are aimed at maintaining positive foreign relations and protect-
ing personal privacy interests in the wake of heightened cross-border data ac-
cessibility. This Note recommends modifications to the CLOUD Act execu-
tive data sharing agreements, including mandated compliance reviews every 
year instead of every five years, required congressional approval of each ex-
ecutive agreement, elimination of the reciprocal data sharing requirement, and 
adding a notice requirement. 
II. CROSS-BORDER DATA SHARING 
Section II of this note will provide a brief history of cross-border data shar-
ing. It will explore the various pieces of legislation used to facilitate interna-
tional flow of data, while highlighting the reasons cross-border data sharing 
is necessary and the problems associated with transferring data this way. This 
Section will demonstrate the inconsistencies between modern technology and 
prior legislation governing cross-border data access; it will show why the 
CLOUD Act was necessary. 
In the 1980s, electronic communication became a main staple of society. 
New inventions such as personal computers, cellular phones, fax machines, 
and pagers ushered in a digital revolution and a new era of digital data.17 Con-
gress, concerned that the Fourth Amendment alone would not adequately pro-
tect electronic communication, passed the Electronic Communications Pri-
vacy Act in 1986.18 Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 
called the Stored Communications Act (SCA), was intended to protect digital 
 
 17 See Gil Press, A Very Short History of Big Data, FORBES (May 9, 2013), https://www.f 
orbes.com/sites/gilpress/2013/05/09/a-very-short-history-of-big-data/#487eedaf65a1. 
 18 Stored Wire and Electronics Communications and Transactional Record Access 
(Stored Communications Act), Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1860 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); Simon M. Baker, Unfriending the Stored Communica-
tions Act: How Technological Advancement and Legislative Inaction Have Rendered Its 
Protections Obsolete, 22 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 75, 81 (2011). 
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communications from unreasonable government interference through “a set 
of Fourth Amendment-like privacy protections.”19 
The SCA’s privacy protections were codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702 and 
2703. Section 2702 described the rules for whether or not a service provider 
could voluntarily disclose information to the government,20 while Section 
2703 detailed the procedure the government had to follow when compelling a 
provider to disclose information.21 
However, the SCA also contained ambiguities and potential data accessi-
bility problems. For example, the SCA expressly prohibited U.S. companies 
from turning over digital data to foreign law enforcement.22 Because of this 
provision, foreign states conducting local investigations that needed data 
stored within their boundaries would still have to go through the U.S. govern-
ment to access that data.23 This system unnecessarily hindered foreign crimi-
nal investigations, and the United States was burdened with a large amount of 
requests for data.24 
It was also not clear whether the SCA prohibited U.S. companies from 
providing the U.S. government with data that was physically stored in foreign 
nations—i.e., whether the SCA applied extraterritorially.25 The SCA’s appli-
cation to data stored on foreign soil was the pinnacle issue in the once-antici-
pated U.S. Supreme Court case Microsoft Corp. v. United States; however, 
the CLOUD Act eliminated the need for judicial intervention by overriding 
this provision of the SCA.26 The CLOUD Act’s intervention will be discussed 
with further detail in Section III of this Note. 
Many critics viewed the SCA as an obstacle to cross-border data sharing 
in criminal investigations.27 Modern criminal investigations often require ob-
taining digital evidence stored in other countries because the data is frequently 
held by U.S. technology companies, which have complex global data man-
agement systems.28 For example, Microsoft stores data based on proximity to 
 
 19 Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s 
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1212 (2004). 
 20 18 U.S.C.A. § 2702 (1986). 
 21 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703 (1986). 
 22 18 U.S.C.A. § 2702 (1986); Chris Cook, Cross-Border Data Access and Active Cyber 
Defense: Assessing Legislative Options for A New International Cybersecurity Rulebook, 
29 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 205, 222 (2018). 
 23 Cook, supra note 22, at 223, 225 (under the old way, foreign states would have to 
petition the U.S. government, which would then require a U.S. judge to approve the transfer 
of data based on a finding of the U.S. standard of probable cause). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 223. 
 26 David Katzmaier, Supreme Court Rules Microsoft Privacy Dispute Moot, CNET 
(Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.cnet.com/news/supreme-court-rules-microsoft-privacy-disp 
ute-moot/. 
 27 Cook, supra note 22, at 222. 
 28 Id. at 222–23. 
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where the customer says he or she is physically located; Google segments and 
stores data by type on different servers around the world.29 
When the SCA was created in 1986, almost all digital data was stored do-
mestically, and the United States had undeniable jurisdiction over that data. 
However, the advent of cloud storage compounded the complexity of data 
management in a way the drafters of the SCA never comprehended.30 
The method for states to obtain international cooperation in criminal in-
vestigations under the SCA regime was through use of mutual legal assistance 
treaties (MLATs).31 These treaties are bilateral cooperation agreements be-
tween nations.32 MLATs assist not only in data sharing, but also apply the 
laws of the nation where the data is stored.33 As an example, if a member of 
the European Union (EU) requested U.S. data by way of an MLAT, the United 
States would be responsible for the investigation that procured the data, and 
that investigation would have to comply with U.S. constitutional require-
ments, including the Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment.34 
The United States currently has an MLAT with every EU member state 
and many other countries across the world.35 The United States entered into 
the multiparty MLAT with the EU in 2010, and the agreement had a specific 
provision dealing with data sharing in criminal investigations.36 
While it may seem that MLATs are a step forward in terms of cross-border 
data sharing, the MLAT process is often criticized as being time-consuming 
and frustrating.37 The process for foreign governments to receive data stored 
 
 29 Id.; Sean Gallagher, The Great Disk Drive in the Sky: How Web Giants Store Big-and 
We Mean Big-Data, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 26, 2012), https://arstechnica.com/information-t 
echnology/2012/01/the-big-disk-drive-in-the-sky-how-the-giants-of-the-web-store-big-da 
ta. 
 30 Cook, supra note 22, at 223. 
 31 T. MARKUS FUNK, MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATIES AND LETTERS ROGATORY: A 
GUIDE FOR JUDGES 8 (2014). 
 32 Id. at 4. 
 33 Id. at 6–7. 
 34 Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing freedom from “unreasonable searches and sei-
zures”); U.S. CONST. amend. V (witnesses deposed in the United States or in a foreign 
country retain the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, regardless of 
whether they are U.S. citizens or foreign nationals). See generally, In re Terrorist Bomb-
ings, U.S. Embassies, E. Africa, 552 F.3d 177, 199 (2nd Cir. 2008) (“[I]t does not matter 
whether the defendant is a U.S. citizen or a foreign national: ‘no person’ tried in the civilian 
courts of the United States can be compelled ‘to be a witness against himself.’”). 
 35 FUNK, supra note 31, at 6. 
 36 Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement, art. 5 U.S.-EU, June 25, 2003, T.I.A.S. No. 10-
201.1 (“The Contracting Parties shall . . . take such measures as may be necessary to enable 
joint investigative teams to be established and operated in the respective territories of the 
United States of America and each Member State for the purpose of facilitating criminal 
investigations or prosecution . . . .”). 
 37 THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC’NS TECHS., LIBERTY AND 
SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD (2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/defa 
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in the United States requires the foreign state to submit a request through the 
Department of Justice Office of International Affairs, which ultimately re-
quires a U.S. Judge to approve the request based on his or her finding of the 
U.S. standard of probable cause.38 According to a study conducted by Presi-
dent Obama’s Review Group in Intelligence and Communications Technolo-
gies, these requests take an average of ten months to complete.39 
A ten-month delay is not conducive to criminal investigations, especially 
when digital data is involved. It is essential for law enforcement to move 
quickly in collecting digital data because there is potential for the data to be 
easily altered or destroyed by simple actions.40  As a result of the frustrating 
delay caused by relying on MLATs, some foreign states experimented with 
their own solutions of collecting digital data.41 These methods included ex-
panding surveillance, mandating data localization, and limiting encryption.42 
Many of the methods go against U.S. interests, such as maintaining an open 
internet.43 
The United States also struggled with conducting criminal investigations 
under the SCA. There was a question of whether domestic warrants, issued 
under the authority of the SCA, applied to data that was physically stored on 
servers located in foreign countries.44 The Second Circuit held that data phys-
ically stored outside U.S. borders was beyond the scope of a domestic war-
rant’s authority under the SCA.45 Concerned that the Second Circuit’s deci-
sion would exacerbate the already massive delay in digital evidence 
collection, the government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, and 
certiorari was granted in United States v. Microsoft Corp.46 Thus, the stage 
was set for the Supreme Court to decide a key issue of data accessibility in the 
modern world; however, Congress took preemptive action and hurriedly re-
solved this issue by passing the CLOUD Act. 
 
ult/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf. 
 38 Tiffany Lin & Mailyn Fidler, Cross-Border Data Access Reform: A Primer on the 
Proposed U.S.-U.K. Agreement, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y AT HARV. 
U. (Sept. 13, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3035563. 
 39 THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC’NS TECHS, supra note 37, 
at 227. 
 40 Goodison et al., supra note 2, at 7. 
 41 Lin & Fidler, supra note 38, at 4. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Cook, supra note 22, at 222. 
 45 In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Mi-
crosoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub nom. U.S. v. Microsoft 
Corp., 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017), and vacated and remanded sub nom. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 
138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018). 
 46 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017) (mem.) (granting govern-
ment’s petition for certiorari). 
620 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L [Vol. 48:613 
III. THE CLARIFYING LAWFUL OVERSEAS USE OF DATA (CLOUD) ACT  
Section III of this note will provide a description of the CLOUD Act and 
its two main functions: applying SCA warrants extraterritorially and allowing 
the executive branch to enter international data sharing agreements. The de-
scription of the Act found in this Section includes the circumstances surround-
ing its enactment, as well as an explanation of the key provisions and require-
ments imposed by the Act. 
Congress enacted the CLOUD Act to modify the SCA and provide legis-
lative guidance on domestic warrant application to data physically stored on 
foreign servers.47 When the CLOUD Act was passed, it was incorporated as 
part of the 2018 Omnibus Spending Bill,48 which is a 2,232-page document 
that authorized $1.3 trillion of government spending in 2018.49 Since the Act 
was part of a larger bill, it did not receive its own standalone floor vote in 
either the House or Senate.50 It also never received a hearing and was never 
reviewed by a committee.51 
Immediately following the CLOUD Act’s adoption, both the Department 
of Justice and Microsoft filed motions to dismiss Microsoft Corp. v. United 
States, arguing the new law rendered the issue of the case moot.52 The Su-
preme Court agreed and released an unsigned opinion that dismissed the 
case.53 
The CLOUD Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2713. It adds a provision to the 
SCA and states: 
A provider of electronic communication service or remote 
computing service shall comply with the obligations of this 
chapter to preserve, backup, or disclose the contents of a wire 
 
 47 Cook, supra note 22, at 226–27. 
 48 Consolidated Appropriations Act, H.R. 1625, 115th Cong. § 102 (2018). 
 49 Iain Thomson, US Congress Quietly Slips Cloud-Spying Powers into Page 2,201 of 
Spending Mega-Bill, REGISTER (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/03/23 
/cloud_act_spending_bill/. 
 50 David Ruiz, Responsibility Deflected, the CLOUD Act Passes, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/03/responsibility-deflected- 
cloud-act-passes. 
 51 Id.; Burying the CLOUD Act inside a massive spending bill was criticized by some 
as a means to push through the legislation without adequate consideration of its merits and 
the public’s concerns; however, analyzing the means by which the Act was passed is out-
side the scope of this Note. 
 52 Monica Nickelsburg, Microsoft and DOJ Ask Supreme Court to Dismiss Case Involv-
ing Customer’s Overseas Data, GEEKWIRE (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.geekwire.com/201 
8/microsoft-doj-ask-supreme-court-dismiss-case-involving-customers-overseas-data/. 
 53 David Katzmaier, Supreme Court Rules Microsoft Privacy Dispute Moot, CNET 
(Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.cnet.com/news/supreme-court-rules-microsoft-privacy-disp 
ute-moot/. 
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or electronic communication and any record or other infor-
mation pertaining to a customer or subscriber within such pro-
vider’s possession, custody, or control, regardless of whether 
such communication, record, or other information is located 
within or outside of the United States.54 
The language of the act unequivocally says that warrants issued through 
the SCA apply to all data under the provider’s “possession, custody, or con-
trol”—regardless of whether the data is physically stored within the United 
States or outside its borders.55 This is an effort to facilitate domestic criminal 
investigation by providing improved accessibility to digital data stored in in-
ternational territory.56 
Domestic criminal investigations are streamlined by this provision because 
MLATs are no longer relied upon for collecting digital evidence. An SCA 
warrant is now, in effect, a one-stop shop to procure all digital data held by a 
U.S. technology company. 
Nevertheless, U.S. technology companies are given an opportunity to chal-
lenge SCA warrants through the CLOUD Act.57 The provider may file a mo-
tion to quash a warrant if the provider reasonably believes both (1) “that the 
customer or subscriber is not a United States person and does not reside in the 
United States” and (2) “that the required disclosure would create a material 
risk that the provider would violate the laws of a qualifying foreign govern-
ment.”58 
The Act goes on to define the standards by which a court should evaluate 
motions to quash SCA warrants. A court may only quash a warrant if it finds 
that 
(1) turning over the data would cause the provider to violate a 
foreign government’s laws; (2) based on the totality of the cir-
cumstances, the interests of justice dictate that the legal pro-
cess should be modified or quashed; and (3) the customer . . . 
is not a United States person and does not reside in the United 
States.59 
Even though the CLOUD Act provides a mechanism for U.S. technology 
companies to challenge SCA warrants pre-enforcement, there are no similar 
 
 54 18 U.S.C.A. § 2713 (2018). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Kharazian, supra note 11. 
 57 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(h)(2) (2019). 
 58 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(h)(2)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 59 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(h)(2)(A)–(B). 
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measures that allow subscribers or customers to challenge SCA warrants pre-
enforcement.60 
The CLOUD Act streamlines domestic data accessibility, but it also ad-
dresses foreign states’ access to U.S.-held data.61 More specifically, the Act 
allows the U.S. executive branch to enter into data sharing executive agree-
ments with qualifying foreign states, thus providing a means for select foreign 
governments to sidestep the cumbersome MLAT process.62 
However, there are substantive and procedural requirements of these ex-
ecutive agreements.63 Foreign states may only enter into a data sharing exec-
utive agreement after both the U.S. Attorney General and Secretary of State 
certify in writing with an accompanying explanation that the foreign state “af-
fords robust substantive and procedural protections for privacy and civil lib-
erties.”64 The foreign state must also agree to give the United States reciprocal 
access to data held by the foreign state.65 Further, the executive branch must 
review and renew each executive agreement every five years to ensure these 
requirements continue to be adequately fulfilled.66 
Each individual request for data issued by a foreign state under an execu-
tive agreement must meet additional requirements. The requests must be suf-
ficiently specific (i.e., target a distinct person, account, device, or other iden-
tifier), have basis in “articulable and credible facts,” be subject to review by 
an independent authority in the foreign state, and cannot be used to infringe 
free speech.67 
However, evaluation of whether the statutory requirements of these agree-
ments are met is a job delegated almost exclusively to the executive branch. 
The CLOUD Act expressly eliminates judicial review as a means of evaluat-
ing these executive agreements: “[a] determination or certification made by 
the Attorney General . . . shall not be subject to judicial or administrative re-
view.”68 In fact, the only means of challenging the executive branch’s decision 
to enter into a data sharing executive agreement is a joint resolution of disap-
proval passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate within 180 
 
 60 Jonathan I. Blackman, Jared Gerber, Nowell D. Bamberger, Georgia V. Stasinopoulos 
& Nicholas G. Amin, CLOUD Act Establishes Framework to Access Overseas Stored Elec-
tronic Communications, 30 No. 6 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 10, 13 (2018). 
 61 Kharazian, supra note 11. 
 62 18 U.S.C.A. § 2523 (2018). 
 63 Id.; Jennifer Daskal, Microsoft Ireland, the Cloud Act, and International Lawmaking 
2.0, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 13 (2018). 
 64 18 U.S.C.A. § 2523(b)(1) (2018). 
 65 18 U.S.C.A. § 2523(b)(4)(I) (2018). 
 66 18 U.S.C.A. § 2523(e) (2018). 
 67 18 U.S.C.A. § 2523(b)(4)(D)(iv) (2018); Daskal, supra note 63, at 14. 
 68 18 U.S.C.A. § 2523(c). 
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days of the Attorney General providing Congress with notice of the executive 
agreement.69 
Another important feature of the CLOUD Act provides that these execu-
tive agreements do not allow foreign states to access the data of U.S. citizens; 
the agreements may only be used to collect data of foreign persons located 
outside of the United States.70 Foreign states who wish to access data of indi-
viduals in the United States (including citizens, legal permanent residents, and 
others located within the physical borders of the United States) must employ 
the MLAT process.71 
IV. DOMESTIC REACTION TO THE CLOUD ACT  
This Section discusses the reaction to the CLOUD Act among entities 
within U.S. borders. It analyzes how U.S. government officials, U.S. technol-
ogy companies, legal academics, and domestic civil liberties organizations re-
sponded to the Act being passed. 
While the CLOUD Act was being considered, and when ultimately passed, 
it was met with a mixed domestic reaction. The U.S. government, many U.S. 
technology companies, and some legal academics voiced strong support for 
the Act; advocates view it as necessary for modern criminal investigations and 
an important answer to previously ambiguous questions regarding cross-bor-
der data accessibility.72 On the other hand, civil liberties groups and privacy 
advocates saw the Act as a violation of basic human rights because it offers 
inadequate freedom of speech and privacy protections for activists operating 
in foreign states.73 
The CLOUD Act gained bipartisan support from members of Congress 
due to its ability to facilitate law enforcement while providing clarity in regard 
 
 69 18 U.S.C.A. § 2523(d)(4)(B). 
 70 Daskal, supra note 63, at 14. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Support for the CLOUD Act of 2018, MICROSOFT (Apr. 11, 2018), https://blogs.micros 
oft.com/uploads/prod/sites/5/2018/04/Support-for-the-CLOUD-Act-of-2018_4.11.18.pdf. 
 73 Joint letter from Access Now, Advocacy for Principled Action in Gov’t, American 
Civil Liberties Union, Amnesty Int’l USA, Asian American Legal Def. and Educ. Fund 
(AALDEF), Campaign for Liberty Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., Ctr.Link: The Cmty. of 
LGBT Ctrs., Constitutional Alliance, Def. Rights & Dissent, Demand Progress Action, 
Elec. Frontier Found., Equal. Cal., Free Press Action Fund, Gov’t Accountability Project, 
Gov’t Info. Watch, Human Rights Watch, Liberty Coalition, Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. 
Lawyers, Nat’l Black Justice Coal., New America’s Open Tech. Inst., OpenMedia, People 
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to cross-border data accessibility.74 It was widely praised among domestic 
legislators as a much needed update to the antiquities and ambiguities of the 
SCA.75 
Most of the major U.S. technology companies (such as Apple, Facebook, 
Google, Microsoft, and Oath) also voiced support for the CLOUD Act.76 The 
above listed companies authored a joint letter that praised the Act as “al-
low[ing] law enforcement to investigate cross-border crime and terrorism in a 
way that avoids international legal conflicts.”77 They further suggested that 
the Act is a necessary means to ensure legal protection for both consumers 
and data holders in the modern world.78 
The Act may also be a means for the United States to ensure responsible 
use of data by foreign states. Some legal academics argue that the periodic 
compliance review requirement under the CLOUD Act presents a good op-
portunity to monitor how foreign states are using data and to police potential 
abuses.79 
On the other hand, some see the five-year term between periodic compli-
ance reviews as a detriment that threatens human rights.80 In an essay written 
by members of the ACLU and Amnesty International, critics sharply rebuked 
the data sharing executive agreement provision of the CLOUD Act as offering 
inadequate protection: “the idea that countries can effectively be safe-listed as 
human-rights compliant, such that their individual data requests need no fur-
ther human rights vetting—is wrong.”81 Civil rights groups maintain that the 
current structure of the CLOUD Act puts international human rights activists 
in danger. They argue that there are no safeguards in situations where a for-
eign state experiences “rapid deterioration in human rights,” such as Turkey 
in mid-2016 after an attempted coup.82 
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Critics also take issue with the level of discretion the Act gives to the ex-
ecutive branch and the vagueness of the standards used to evaluate individual 
data requests.83 It is possible that foreign states with good overall human rights 
protections could abuse the executive agreements on an individual level. For 
example, Poland is a country with strong political rights and civil liberties 
protections; therefore, Poland would most likely be able to enter a data sharing 
executive agreement under the CLOUD Act.84 But, in 2017, Poland engaged 
in an abuse of data collection by raiding the offices of several women’s rights 
groups and confiscating hard drives containing sensitive personal data.85 The 
CLOUD Act could theoretically be used in a similar capacity—to seize data 
and stunt the progress of activists and other political opponents.86 
Proponents of the CLOUD Act counter that it is a step forward in protect-
ing civil liberties because it disincentivizes foreign states from turning to local 
legislation to avoid the MLAT process.87 As foreign states became frustrated 
with the cumbersome MLAT process, they faced pressure to pass laws that 
mandated data localization, such as requiring all citizens’ digital data to be 
stored within that country’s borders.88 Mandated data localization means all 
information would be available to foreign governments under local laws. In 
many countries, that could lead to police access to data “without any judicial 
process.”89 
Alternatively, foreign states could rely on invasive data collection tech-
niques to get around MLATs, such as expanding surveillance and limiting use 
of encryption.90 None of these options are desirable outcomes from a privacy 
and civil liberties perspective.91 They infringe upon individual privacy rights 
and are contrary to the goal of an open internet.92 
V. FOREIGN REACTION TO THE CLOUD ACT  
Section V of this Note illustrates foreign response to the CLOUD Act. This 
Section looks at the governments of various foreign states, as well as interna-
tional human rights organizations, to provide a complete picture of the impact 
passing the CLOUD Act had on the international community. It also provides 
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analysis and suggests reasons why foreign governments may have reacted 
similarly. This Section further explores potential conflicts of laws and other 
foreign regulations that may be oppositional to the Act.   
The Australian government wholly supports the CLOUD Act. Australia 
released a statement after the law was passed, which complimented the Act’s 
ability to improve law enforcement efficiency while protecting personal 
data.93 However, Australia’s positive reaction is not consistent with the over-
all foreign response to this legislation. The general foreign reaction is better 
characterized as one of uncertainty and unease, especially among the United 
Kingdom (UK) and other EU member states.94 
Concerns about the rushed nature of the CLOUD Act and the Act’s lack 
of compatibility with the EU’s newly passed General Data Protection Regu-
lation (GDPR) led to a foreign backlash against the Act.95  EU justice com-
missioner Vera Jourova described the Act’s adoption as a “fast-track proce-
dure, which narrows the room for the potential compatible solution between 
the EU and the U.S.”96 Another European critic described the CLOUD Act as 
an “unstoppable weapon” that would allow the United States “to dominate the 
world” and further argued that data held by U.S. technology companies can 
no longer be considered secure.97 
Adoption of the CLOUD Act came at a time when the EU was working 
toward more robust personal privacy protections of digital data. Two months 
after the CLOUD Act was signed into law, the EU’s General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), a sweeping privacy regulation, was enacted.98 The 
GDPR is a binding piece of legislation that is enforceable in all EU member 
states.99 Among other privacy regulations, the GDPR gives citizens in the EU 
control over their personal data and establishes a right for citizens to demand 
their personal data be deleted, even if that data is stored in a different coun-
try.100 Another important provision of the GDPR prevents transferring 
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personal data to a foreign state in any manner which is otherwise inconsistent 
with the GDPR.101 Any potential conflict between restricted data sharing un-
der the GDPR and the CLOUD Act’s reciprocal requirement is further ex-
plored in Section VI of this Note. 
Likewise, China also has local data sharing regulations that could conflict 
with the CLOUD Act. The recently enacted Cyber Security Law (CSL) re-
quires sensitive data (e.g., information on Chinese citizens or relating to na-
tional security) to be stored domestically on Chinese servers.102 The law also 
prohibits Chinese companies from transferring sensitive data to authorities 
abroad without undergoing clearance from the Chinese government first.103 
China is not the only foreign state requiring data localization; India re-
cently issued a directive mandating that all data related to financial transac-
tions conducted in India must be stored on local Indian servers.104 Further, the 
Indian Parliament is also considering a bill that would require all data col-
lected, shared, or processed in India to be physically stored within India’s bor-
ders.105 
The National Assembly of Vietnam recently passed a similar law.106 This 
new Vietnamese legislation, which is entitled the Law on Cybersecurity No. 
24/2018/QH14 (Cybersecurity Law) and took effect January 1, 2019,i requires 
data localization within the territory of Vietnam.107 The data localization man-
date applies to foreign and domestic enterprises that provide services via the 
internet in Vietnam and are involved in collection, analysis, and processing of 
personal data; and data generated by users in Vietnam.108109 
Data localization mandates are rationalized based on a fear of unwarranted 
foreign surveillance and a need to bolster law enforcement by local 
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agencies.110 However, these laws do more harm than good in terms of both 
privacy rights and data security.111 Data localization does nothing to curtail 
foreign surveillance—due to sophisticated data surveillance techniques, phys-
ical access is not necessary for international spies to conduct surveillance.112 
Also, data security experts argue these international wrongdoers “are not de-
terred by new laws; keeping data within a border won’t stop those who believe 
that rules don’t apply to them.”113 
Data localization does, however, open the door to privacy abuses from lo-
cal entities.114 It also creates a vulnerability to natural disasters destroying all 
copies of data,115 increases cost of data storage,116 and negatively impacts in-
ternational trade.117 Additionally, mandated data localization is contrary to the 
idea of a free internet, which is a value traditionally championed by the United 
States.118 It instead leads to a “balkanization” of the internet, fragmenting a 
once cohesive entity into many separate and distinct versions of the internet 
spread out across the globe.119 
Advocates of the CLOUD Act argue that the executive data sharing agree-
ments hold down on mandated data localization; because foreign states could 
rely on an efficient way to get U.S.-held data, the theory was those states 
would be more open to allowing their citizens’ data to be stored via U.S. com-
panies and extraterritorial servers.120 However, that desired result was not 
achieved. The previously discussed data localization efforts in China, India, 
and Vietnam indicate the CLOUD Act was not successful in deterring recent 
pushes toward localization.121 In fact, these Asian countries appear to be dou-
bling down on localization efforts in the wake of the CLOUD Act. Data 
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localization mandates show that, even under the CLOUD Act’s regime, for-
eign states are hesitant to allow free access by the United States to their local 
data. 
Much like many foreign governments, international human rights organi-
zations are also made uneasy by the CLOUD Act’s potential to spread per-
sonal data across borders.122 There are no major international human rights 
groups that support the Act.123 Amnesty International’s U.S. director Naureen 
Shah expressed “grave misgivings” for the CLOUD Act, stating that it “jeop-
ardizes the lives and safety of thousands of human rights defenders.”124 Sim-
ilarly, Human Rights Watch, which is a nonprofit organization that investi-
gates and reports on human rights abuses across the globe, argues the new 
international data sharing process under the Act gutted prior human rights 
protections.125 
The main issues that human rights advocates have with the CLOUD Act 
are directed at the executive agreements section; more specifically, the five-
year window between U.S. compliance reviews and the concentration of 
power solely in the executive branch are causes for concern.126 The lengthy 
amount of time between U.S. evaluations of a foreign state’s privacy and hu-
man rights protections could allow a once-compliant nation to rapidly deteri-
orate and abuse data collection for an extended period between compliance 
reviews.127 Some critics also argue that there is risk the U.S. government will 
enter into these executive agreements for political reasons, even if the foreign 
state is known to abuse privacy rights.128 That risk is further exacerbated by 
the lack of congressional input into the validity of the executive agree-
ments.129 
VI. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CLOUD ACT  
The remaining portion of this Note focuses on proposed amendments to 
the CLOUD Act’s executive agreements provision. The intent is to provide 
legislators with suggestions of how to adjust the law in order to better foster 
positive international relations, further encourage foreign states to participate 
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in these agreements, and provide more stringent protections for international 
human rights. 
The proposed amendments are suggestions to improve the CLOUD Act; 
however, this Note does not take the position that the Act is a harmful piece 
of legislation. On the contrary, this Note argues the Act represents positive 
change. The CLOUD Act is necessary for effective law enforcement in the 
modern world. Though digital forensics and collection of digital evidence are 
relatively new concepts for law enforcement, investigators rely heavily on 
digital data in modern criminal investigations.130 Because data management 
systems are complex and much of this important data is stored across the 
globe,131 law enforcement must frequently obtain digital evidence that is phys-
ically stored in a foreign state. The already overburdened MLAT process was 
not equipped to handle collection of data for criminal investigations; a ten-
month delay in the investigation, caused by relying on MLATs, cannot yield 
effective law enforcement.132 
The CLOUD Act’s extraterritorial application of SCA warrants improved 
accessibility and solved the time delay problem involved with criminal inves-
tigations on a domestic level. It relieved the strain placed on the overburdened 
MLAT system and made clear that U.S. law will apply in evidence collection 
where a U.S. technology company has custody of the digital data. 
The concerns raised by privacy advocates are not as potent when evaluat-
ing domestic investigations. United States law, and its robust privacy protec-
tions under the Fourth Amendment, still apply to extraterritorial SCA war-
rants.133 The full process must be satisfied, including showing a finding of 
probable cause.134 Even though the United States would not be required to 
follow the exact law of the foreign state where the evidence was physically 
stored, it still would safeguard against abuses through its own privacy protec-
tions. There is little fear that applying SCA warrants extraterritorially will lead 
to domestic privacy abuses within the boundaries of the United States. In fact, 
the ACLU and other human rights organizations aim their privacy criticisms 
solely at the executive agreements provision of the CLOUD Act, not its ap-
plication to SCA warrants.135 
It makes logical sense that U.S. law would apply in digital evidence col-
lection for an alleged crime against the United States, where a U.S. company 
has control over the evidence—regardless of the data storage facility’s 
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geographic location. The United States government, most major U.S. technol-
ogy companies, and many legal academics all agree that SCA warrants apply-
ing to data physically stored outside of the United States is a positive, neces-
sary step aligned with the needs of modern technology.136 
Conversely, there is room to improve the second function of the CLOUD 
Act: its executive agreements provision. The idea to create a means for foreign 
states to enter mutual agreements that allow for easier data sharing across bor-
ders is a positive change; however, the CLOUD Act misses the mark on vari-
ous functional points. 
The Act was a rushed piece of legislation, buried as part of a larger spend-
ing bill and passed without thorough vetting or consideration on international 
impact.137 This is the reason for the overall negative response from foreign 
governments and international human rights groups regarding these new ex-
ecutive agreements.138 There also exists domestic distrust regarding these ex-
ecutive agreements.139 However, with a few key changes suggested below, the 
data sharing agreements could be improved without hindering their function-
ality. 
 
A. Mandatory Annual Compliance Review  
 
Human rights protections are an important consideration when discussing 
cross-border data sharing agreements because increased data accessibility 
could potentially infringe on the right to privacy.140 Therefore, only foreign 
states with adequate human rights protections and privacy protections should 
be permitted to participate in these agreements. The CLOUD Act recognized 
the need for stringent protections; thus, the Act imposed a lengthy set of hu-
man rights prerequisites on foreign states looking to enter an executive agree-
ment.141 Both the U.S. Attorney General and Secretary of State certify in writ-
ing with an accompanying explanation that the foreign state has adequate 
privacy and civil liberties protections before an executive agreement may ex-
ist with that foreign state.142 
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However, the U.S. government’s evaluation of a foreign state’s human 
rights compliance is insufficient. Evaluation of privacy and civil liberties pro-
tections occurs prior to entering the agreement, with follow-up compliance 
reviews in subsequent five-year intervals.143 This process effectively white-
lists foreign states as human rights compliant for an extended period; it allows 
continued access to data, even in situations where a state experiences rapid 
decline in its human rights protections.144 To combat this problem, mandatory 
reviews of the foreign state’s privacy and human rights protections should 
occur once every year. 
Following an attempted coup in 2016, Turkey declared an ongoing state of 
emergency and waged war on all government criticism.145 The Turkish gov-
ernment imprisoned hundreds of journalists and media workers, raided offices 
of human rights organizations, disrupted peaceful protests, and tortured activ-
ists in police custody.146 This drastic decay of human rights protections oc-
curred within one year.147 If Turkey had an executive data sharing agreement 
with the United States prior to these events, the current compliance review 
scheme under the CLOUD Act would be insufficient to diagnose and prevent 
abuses in data collection. Events in Turkey illustrate that a five year window 
between compliance reviews will not safeguard against a foreign state that 
bottoms out its human rights protections within those five years. 
More frequent compliance reviews are necessary to prevent abuse. While 
it is true that increased resources would be required to administer more fre-
quent compliance reviews, the additional protection would be worth any mar-
ginal inconvenience. Further, there are methods that could help facilitate ad-
ministrability; for example, the process could include an incentive program 
that makes the burden of showing compliance lighter for foreign states with a 
demonstrated history of high protections on privacy and human rights.148 An-
nual compliance reviews under this proposed system would keep a closer 
watch for data collection abuses, while still maintaining an efficient level of 
administrability. Further, the level of administrability would still be far supe-
rior than its predecessor, the MLAT system.149 
Annual compliance reviews would have the further benefit of collecting 
more results on compliance trends, which would give the U.S. government an 
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opportunity to identify overall problem areas and evaluate whether the regu-
lations baked into the CLOUD Act had the desired effect on foreign states.150 
In addition, the main contention international human rights groups, such 
as the ACLU and Amnesty International, have with the CLOUD Act is its 
relatively infrequent compliance reviews of human rights protections.151 
Changing to an annual compliance review model would help appease these 
groups and may even garner their support for changes made under the 
CLOUD Act, which could improve foreign reaction to the executive agree-
ments and encourage adoption. 
 
B. Congressional Approval of Executive Agreements  
 
As its name suggests, executive agreements under the CLOUD Act are 
almost entirely within the purview of the executive branch. The judiciary is 
taken out of this process through statutory language that expressly eliminates 
judicial review.152 Similarly, the legislature’s role is severely limited. Con-
gress has 180 days from notice of the agreement to pass a joint resolution of 
disapproval in both the House of Representatives and the Senate;153 otherwise, 
Congress has no recourse to challenge these executive data-sharing agree-
ments. The CLOUD Act is an example that highlights the common phenom-
enon of international agreements made by the executive branch acting alone, 
which also raises questions about separation of powers and equitable interna-
tional lawmaking.154 A better approach is to require congressional approval of 
each individual data sharing agreement, while creating a “fast track” system 
that would streamline the process. Congressional supervision would create a 
more balanced, democratic, and effective approach without sacrificing much 
efficiency. 
There is no problem with the CLOUD Act expressly eliminating judicial 
review. In accordance with the political question doctrine, the judicial branch 
defers on issues related to international agreements approved by Congress.155 
As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Made in the USA Founda-
tion v. United States, “the choice of what procedure to use for a given agree-
ment is committed to the discretion and expertise of the Legislative and 
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Executive Branches by virtue of the political question doctrine.”156 Therefore, 
statutory language eliminating judicial review in the context of cross-border 
data sharing executive agreements is proper; it puts an articulable point on a 
concept already followed by the courts. 
Congressional involvement in executive agreements, however, is neces-
sary to ensure democratic accountability. Unfortunately, congressional in-
volvement is typically limited in the context of international agreements. The 
legislature’s role in conducting international agreements was evaporated post-
World War II by a systematic yielding of power to the President.157 Congress 
passed a wide variety of statutes, many of which were vague and open-ended, 
that allowed the President to put executive agreements into force without fur-
ther legislative involvement.158 
Agreements enacted by the executive branch under advanced authority 
granted by Congress are often called “ex ante” congressional-executive agree-
ments, and they account for approximately eighty percent of all U.S. interna-
tional legal commitments.159 Executive agreements under the CLOUD Act are 
examples of ex ante congressional-executive agreements. 
Utilizing ex ante congressional-executive agreements presents a problem 
because it centralizes international lawmaking ability within the executive 
branch.160 Congress has very little power regarding these agreements.161 In 
theory, Congress has the power to adjust ex ante congressional-executive 
agreements through passing subsequent legislation; however, this is rarely 
achieved in reality because any effort to revoke or limit executive power can 
be vetoed by the President.162 
Some argue that this change is a good thing, that international agreements 
are best left to the sole discretion of the executive branch. They contend that 
separation of powers concerns are not as strong when the consequences 
mostly affect institutions outside the United States.163 Further, they assert that 
sole executive power might have the added benefits of ensuring consistent 
leadership in foreign relations while giving the President stronger negotiating 
power.164 
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These arguments are misguided. Even though executive agreements deal 
with institutions and actors beyond U.S. borders, unilateral international law-
making by the executive branch produces significant domestic impact.165 The 
United States is held to follow the rules of foreign interaction prescribed by 
the President—he or she alone dictates how the rest of the country must act 
regarding many matters such as foreign commerce and diplomacy.166 
Additionally, placing all international lawmaking power on the President 
does not lead to more effective lawmaking. Creating effective international 
law requires adequate political support to ensure that international commit-
ments created under the agreements are actually performed.167 While agree-
ments negotiated by the president acting alone may be easier to create, those 
agreements are less likely to be followed. For example, a subsequent presi-
dential administration might withdraw from or fail to observe an agreement 
made by a previous president acting on their own. That same subsequent ad-
ministration would be much more cautious about failing to honor an agree-
ment that was passed with consent of Congress.168 
Placing the power to conduct international lawmaking in a single branch 
of government also violates separation of powers. Government power must 
be divided into separated institutions; the system is designed to prevent the 
distinct branches of government from controlling the functions of other 
branches.169 Ex ante congressional-executive agreements, such as agreements 
under the CLOUD Act, completely destroy this purpose by giving the execu-
tive branch the ability to create international law. The President is given the 
ability to “write” international laws by exercising sole discretion over which 
foreign states will have an executive data sharing agreement with the United 
States. Creating laws is a power of the legislative branch of the U.S. govern-
ment. Even though the President is, in effect, creating international law, the 
executive branch remains immune from democratic accountability. There is 
potential risk that a President could use executive agreements as political 
tools, even if those agreements are contrary to democratic interests. 
The risk of politicizing executive agreements is especially dangerous in 
the context of data sharing. As discussed previously, the CLOUD Act author-
izes agreements that are integral to aiding modern law enforcement; presi-
dents may use these highly desirable agreements as bargaining chips to ad-
vance political agendas. However, these agreements are also volatile because 
of the sensitivity of information and risk that governments could use that 
 
 165 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 163, at 1253. 
 166 See id. (discussing in detail the various impacts unilateral presidential international 
lawmaking has on all forms of domestic institutions, including later presidents, Congress, 
courts, states, American individuals and private firms.) 
 167 Hathaway, supra note 154, at 231. 
 168 Id. at 232. 
 169 Jack M. Beermann, An Inductive Understanding of Separation of Powers, 63 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 467, 468 (2011). 
636 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L [Vol. 48:613 
information to abuse human rights; this is the reason each agreement is scru-
tinized through robust human rights protections. Nonetheless, it is easy to im-
agine situations where a president might bend the rules on enforcing human 
rights protections in order to push through an executive data sharing agree-
ment that would result in political gain. 
If this type of misbehavior occurred, Congress would be powerless to stop 
it. The only recourse available to Congress (or any other entity) would be to 
pass subsequent legislation, which the President could veto. Abuses in creat-
ing cross-border data sharing agreements are egregious because they result in 
threats against the privacy and safety of people across the globe. It is impera-
tive for the United States to take all reasonable measures in order to protect 
against those abuses, including congressional approval of each agreement as 
a check on executive power. 
Congressional approval of the individual agreements would add a step to 
the process, but it would not result in a substantial loss of efficiency if a “fast 
track” procedure was adopted. This type of expedited approval is sometimes 
used in the context of trade agreements.170 
The fast track procedure required the leaders of the House and Senate to 
introduce trade agreements proposed by the President on the same day the 
agreement was submitted or on the next day possible if a house was not in 
session.171 The agreement could not be amended,172 debate on the agreement 
was limited to “not more than 20 hours” in each house,173 filibusters were not 
permitted in the Senate,174 and the agreement would pass by a simple majority 
vote in each house.175 These votes were required to take place “on or before 
the close of the 15th day” after the implementing bill or approval resolution 
was reported out of committee.176 
A similar procedural framework could speed up the congressional ap-
proval process of executive data sharing agreements. Though fast track has 
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never been used outside the scope of trade agreements, legal academic Oona 
Hathaway argues that a fast track process could apply to “approval of interna-
tional agreements in any area of international law.”177  Therefore, this process 
could be adopted on a narrow basis to facilitate congressional approval of 
cross-border data sharing executive agreements under the CLOUD Act and 
any other agreement that involves sharing of sensitive personal data. Narrow-
ing the scope of the fast track process would limit inefficiency by not burden-
ing Congress with approval of every executive agreement. 
While the features of a fast track process (such as limited debate and pro-
hibition of amendments) may seem disadvantageous to Congress, fast track 
would still provide Congress with an important check on executive power. It 
would do so in a way that is easy to administer and would not sacrifice effi-
ciency, while also protecting against abuses in creating these potentially dan-
gerous data sharing agreements. 
The risk of politicizing executive data sharing agreements requires imple-
mentation of a congressional approval system. A fast track procedure, similar 
to what has been previously utilized in trade agreements, is the most efficient 
way to do so. Adding this protection might not have a huge impact on affect-
ing foreign perception of the changes made under the CLOUD Act; however, 
a congressional approval protection is an important measure to ensure separa-
tion of powers and equitable international lawmaking. Both of those concepts 
have the potential to cause a major impact on both a domestic and interna-
tional scale. 
 
C. Eliminate Reciprocal Data Sharing Requirement for Executive 
Agreements  
 
Included in the CLOUD Act’s executive agreement provision is a recipro-
cal data sharing requirement.178 In order to enter an executive agreement, the 
foreign state must grant the U.S. reciprocal access to data held by the foreign 
state.179 This requirement presents a problem because compliance with recip-
rocal data sharing could be contrary to local laws of the foreign state.180 The 
EU’s recently passed GDPR makes it unlawful to transfer data unless certain 
conditions are met.181 With mandated reciprocal data sharing, situations could 
arise where an EU member state would be forced to compel a local service 
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provider to turn over data to the United States when that transfer would oth-
erwise be unlawful under the GDPR. 
Article 48 of the GDPR does carve out an exception that allows transfers 
made pursuant to an international agreement, such as an MLAT.182 But it is 
not yet known whether executive agreements under the CLOUD Act will sat-
isfy Article 48.183 Because the executive agreements would offer fewer pri-
vacy protections on an individual level, GDPR protection authorities could 
determine the CLOUD Act agreements are inconsistent with the protections 
contemplated by Article 48.184 
China enacted the Cyber Security Law (CSL) in 2017,185 which is a robust 
piece of legislation intended to prevent cyberattacks and protect data privacy. 
Article 37 of the CSL requires personal and other important information to be 
physically stored on servers in China; it also prevents transferring that data 
abroad without prior approval and a security assessment from Chinese regu-
lators.186 This is another example of a conflict between the CLOUD Act and 
local laws of a foreign state. Even though a CLOUD Act executive agreement 
would require China to reciprocally share their data with the United States, 
the CSL would prohibit them from doing so. 
Forced reciprocity among data-sharing agreements may contribute to the 
unease many foreign states have for these agreements. The majority of the 
world’s digital data is held by U.S. technology companies,187 so the United 
States has a bargaining chip to entice foreign states into an executive data-
sharing agreement. However, to get easier access to this wealth of U.S. held 
data, the foreign state must also make data held by its entities available to the 
U.S. The EU, China, and other countries that have recently increased data 
protections might see this as invasive. These countries, and many others, are 
avoiding measures that liberalize cross-border data accessibility (such as the 
CLOUD Act executive agreements) and instead are restricting data flow 
through laws that block cross-border transfers and mandate data localiza-
tion.188   
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Restricting data accessibility fractures the digital world and leads to unde-
sirable outcomes. When all data is forcibly stored in one state, there is in-
creased risk of privacy abuses from the government of that state or other en-
tities.189 Restricted data accessibility also restricts international trade190 and 
increases data storage costs.191 The United States must do everything it can to 
ensure effective accessibility of data across borders, which includes encour-
aging adoption of as many data sharing agreements as possible. 
Some may have a gut reaction that it is “unfair” to provide foreign states 
with easier access to U.S.-held data without receiving reciprocal access, but 
reciprocal data sharing does not have much value to the U.S. because most 
digital data is already held by U.S. technology companies,192 and the CLOUD 
Act gives the United States easy access to that data, regardless of where it is 
physically stored, through SCA warrants.193 In the rare instances where the 
United States needs access to data held by a foreign company in a foreign 
state, the United States can still rely on MLATs to retrieve the data.194 
More positive outcomes for the U.S. would be achieved through eliminat-
ing the reciprocal data sharing requirement of CLOUD Act executive agree-
ments. If foreign states did not have the pressure of reciprocal data sharing, 
they would be further incentivized to join in these agreements; there would be 
no reason for any qualified country not to have an agreement with the U.S. 
Entering into agreements with as many foreign states as possible is in the 
best interests of the United States because it would improve foreign perception 
of the CLOUD Act, encourage adoption of these executive agreements, dis-
courage mandated data localization laws, and thus encourage foreign states 
(and the people in foreign states) to use U.S. technology companies. This 
would ultimately give the United States better accessibility to more data than 
would be achieved by reciprocation under the executive agreements. 
 
D. Notice Requirement  
 
The right to notice when a search warrant is executed and personal prop-
erty is seized is a common principle of U.S. law.195 A notice requirement is 
important because it affords the owner of the property due process and allows 
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him or her to manage or retrieve the seized property.196 It follows that the 
same principle would apply when an SCA warrant is executed and personal 
data is seized. While there may be an argument that the notice requirement 
under U.S. law would apply to domestic search warrants, the executive agree-
ment provision does not have a notice requirement.197 The CLOUD Act does 
not require notice to be provided to a foreign person whose data is targeted 
and seized via an executive data sharing agreement.198 
A requirement of notice when personal property is taken (including per-
sonal data) is a phenomenon adopted by many countries around the world. In 
fact, over 100 countries have data protection laws, and many of those laws 
include a right to notice.199 
The EU and its member states are particularly concerned with data privacy 
and providing citizens autonomy over their personal data.200 In addition to 
severely limited circumstances imposed by the GDPR that restrict when per-
sonal data can be collected and transferred across international borders,201 the 
GDPR also expands the type of notice data owners must receive when their 
data is transferred.202 
Asian, Latin American, and African countries also have their own notice 
requirements and data protection obligations.203 These laws tend to have some 
commonality, inclusive of a notice requirement.204 Generally speaking, notice 
requirements in these nations typically consist of notifying the data owner of 
“what personal information is collected, why it is collected, and with whom it 
is shared.”205 
Notice is an important concept to many foreign states in the context of 
collecting and sharing personal data. Because of this, the CLOUD Act execu-
tive agreements provision should be amended to include a notice requirement. 
When personal data is transferred via an executive data-sharing agreement, 
the owner of that data should be notified of the process. At minimum, notice 
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of what personal data was accessed and that the government has the data 
should be required when a request under a data-sharing agreement is fulfilled. 
Adopting this type of notice requirement would stay in line with the data 
protection schemes that many countries have across the globe.206 It would re-
duce potential conflicts of laws by ensuring data transfers under executive 
agreements were held to the same or similar data protection restrictions of the 
particular jurisdiction. 
Adding a notice requirement would also make executive data sharing 
agreements under the CLOUD Act more appealing to foreign states and the 
people of those nations. Because the constituents of a foreign state are better 
protected and informed through a notice requirement, adding this measure will 
likely lead to greater local support among a foreign state. A notice requirement 
would also reduce complexity by remedying potential conflicts of laws, pro-
vide clearer expectations, and help demonstrate government transparency 
within a foreign state. 
All of these benefits suggest that a notice requirement would incentivize 
adoption of executive data-sharing agreements. As discussed in Section V, 
Subsection C of this Note, the interests of the U.S., and the international com-
munity at large will be best served by encouraging the adoption of interna-
tional agreements and eliminating the need for alternative, harmful measures 
such as mandated data localization. 
VII. CONCLUSION  
The CLOUD Act was a necessary piece of legislation that solved data ac-
cess problems faced by modern law enforcement. Due to changes in technol-
ogy, the prior version of the SCA was insufficient, and changes affected by 
the CLOUD Act needed to be made. Cloud storage and complex data man-
agement systems necessitate extraterritorial application of SCA warrants. 
It is unreasonable to require law enforcement to rely on cumbersome, time-
consuming MLATs when conducting criminal investigations. A ten-month 
delay on received data via MLAT is detrimental to criminal investigations; 
modern law enforcement could not operate effectively under that system. Ex-
traterritorial SCA warrants solve the time delay problem by streamlining the 
process, while keeping in line with the intentions of the SCA. 
The executive data-sharing agreements allowed by the CLOUD Act also 
have potential to be meaningful tools in the modern world. They can facilitate 
data-sharing across borders and ensure that the internet continues to be one 
open, free-flowing entity. Productive results such as these are the reason many 
people and entities in the U.S. support the CLOUD Act. 
Without data-sharing agreements of this kind, foreign states turn to other, 
more harmful methods to regulate data. Measures such as mandated data 
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localization “balkanize” the internet and lead to host of other issues including 
negative impact on international trade, increased data storage costs, and 
greater susceptibility to destruction of data by natural disasters. It is impera-
tive that the U.S. uses all means available to improve these executive agree-
ments and encourage their adoption. Utilizing responsible cross-border data 
sharing agreements is a better way to ensure proper management of data on 
an international level, compared to the potentially harmful alternatives. 
Though the Act was met by mostly positive reaction from domestic insti-
tutions, there were some domestic entities that criticized the Act as offering a 
means for foreign states to abuse civil liberties while offering inadequate pro-
tections on human rights. The domestic criticisms of the CLOUD Act pertain 
to the executive agreements provision. Therefore, improving executive agree-
ments to better protect privacy and civil liberties of foreign persons would 
have the added benefit of improving domestic perception and support for the 
Act. 
Overall foreign response to the CLOUD Act was not positive; many for-
eign states were uneasy about the Act, seeing it as an extension of United 
States power into the international sphere. These concerns could be alleviated 
through improvements to the executive agreements provision of the Act. 
The CLOUD Act is a good start, but it’s an imperfect document. Several 
key amendments to the Act could improve upon it and help alleviate the con-
cern expressed domestically and abroad. Mandatory annual compliance re-
views would improve the CLOUD Act because they would ensure that only 
foreign states who maintained human rights and privacy protections could ac-
cess sensitive data. 
A compliance review of these protections conducted every year would de-
fend against a country that experiences a rapid decline in human rights; more 
frequent compliance reviews would prevent “whitelisting” foreign states as 
human rights compliant for extended periods of time. 
Congressional approval of each individual agreement is another change 
that would improve the CLOUD Act’s executive agreements provision. Cen-
tralizing the ability to enter the agreements solely within the purview of the 
executive branch violates separation of powers and is not an effective means 
of international lawmaking. Due to the sensitivity of information distributed 
under these agreements and its desirable nature, a risk exists that the executive 
branch could abuse the agreements for political gain. Congress must be in-
volved in order to inject democratic accountability into the process while 
providing a check on presidential power. Congress could achieve this purpose 
without sacrificing efficiency by adopting a “fast track” method to approve 
the agreements. 
The CLOUD Act would also be improved by removing the reciprocal data-
sharing requirement. For the reasons stated previously, it is important for the 
U.S. to encourage foreign states to adopt executive data sharing agreements. 
Fear over U.S. access to data is a main factor in the overall foreign unease 
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surrounding the CLOUD Act; that fear will be a barrier to encouraging adop-
tion of these agreements. The U.S. will not get much benefit from reciprocal 
data-sharing because most of the world’s data is already held by U.S. compa-
nies, and thus accessible to the United States via SCA warrants. 
The U.S. would receive more benefit from the increased adoption of exec-
utive data-sharing agreements than the reciprocal requirement, which is hin-
dering the agreements’ adoption. Without a reciprocal data-sharing require-
ment, foreign states previously focused on data localization may even be 
incentivized to allow use of U.S. technology company services—which would 
lead to more people in those countries using U.S. technology services and in 
turn would give the U.S. greater access to that data in the long run. 
Finally, a notice requirement should be added that would require the owner 
of any personal data to be notified when a transfer via executive agreement is 
fulfilled. This measure would reduce conflict of laws issues, improve local 
approval of data-sharing agreements, and foster government transparency in 
the foreign state. 
These changes would lead to increased positive reaction to the Act, better 
foreign relations, and more robust international human rights protections. 
They would also encourage maintaining an open internet and disincentivize 
laws in foreign states that mandate data localization. 
The CLOUD Act is already a domestic success. Most people within U.S. 
borders support it and the changes it represents. Although foreign reaction is 
not as favorable, minor changes in the CLOUD Act could go a long way in 
bettering its international impact. The amendments expressed in this Note will 
help improve domestic impression, while also bettering the Act’s international 
impact and its role in U.S. foreign relations. Nevertheless, the CLOUD Act is 
an important piece of legislation in the modern era of digital data proliferation, 
and it will affect meaningful change on a global scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
